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IN THE SUPREME COURIT
of the

,STAT'E OF UTAH
GLEN A. HATCH and EDITH E.
HATCH,
Plaintiffs a.nd Appellants,

-vs.-

Case No. 8215

W. S. HATCH CO~IP ANY, a corporation, and WILLARD S. HATCH,
Defendants awd Respondents.

BRIEF O·F' RE'SPONDENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is a suit wherein plaintiffs seek to enjoin the
operation of defendants' trucking business because, it
is alleged, the noises incident to the repairing and greasing of trucks, changing of tires and running of motors
constitute an actionable nuisance. Glen A. Hatch and
Williard S. Hatch are brothers and in possession of adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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joining property situated in Woods Cross, Davis County,
Utah, which locale, with its Phillips Petroleum Refinery,
1s one of the most highly industrialized areas in the
state.
The case was tried before the Honorable Parley E.
N orseth, sitting without a jury, and after presentation
of both plaintiffs' and defendants' evidence and a
thorough view of both parties' premises, the court found
as a matter of fact that no actionable nuisance existed.
During the trial court's inspection of defendants' garage
and repair shop the several operations of greasing, tire
changing, poun'ding on tanks and driving a diesel tractor
around the yard were demonstrated to the court. In all
fairness and justice to both plaintiffs and defendants, the
court reached the conclusion that the noises were not unreasonably loud and in view of the industrialized character of the area could not be said to constitute a nuisance
as they might affect plaintiffs. (Finding of F'act No. 5,
R.. 14)
Plaintiffs have attempted to exculpate the far greater sources of noise in the neighborhood (Onion Street
traffic an d mainline Union Pacific Railroad) an'd have
ignored the 1nany pTactices and devices employed by W.
S. Hatch Co. to cut down all unnecessary disturbance.
Plaintiffs have been entirely unreasonable in their deInands. Th.eir demeanor on the witness stand and tone
1

of voice Tn testifying, particularly that of Edith E. Hatch,
a1nply supports the finding of the trial court that they
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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are "supersensitive to the defendants' activities and that
this supersensitiveness is occasioned by the animosity
bet-vveen the plaintiffs anld the defenldant, Williard S.
Hatch." (Finding of Fact No.5, R .. 14)
STATEMEN'T OF F'ACTS
*See Flootnote
Appellants' brief contends that the findings of fact
drawn by counsel for the respondents (after the trial
court published its memorandum decision) do not truly
represent the situation as it exists; that the actual facts
have been either misrepresented and distorted or absurdly minimized or ignored.
From a study of their brief, it is apparent that it
is not the finldings of evidentiary facts with which appellants disagree, but the conclusions as to their ultimate
classification. The trial court concluded that the area
was in fact industrial and that the noises and lights
complained of were within the bounds of reason.
It is significant that plaintiffs produced no photographs, or exhibits whatsoever, to illustrate the area
involved. The traffic count of trains and trucks which
pass by their house as revealed by defendants' Exhibits
Nos. 7 and 8, and the photographs produced by the defendants show the true character of plaintiffs' property.
*Note: The judgment roll is designated as "R" and the transcript of testimony as '~T", inasmuch as the clerk has not stamped
the entire record by number.
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This being a case seeking equitable relief, it is proper
for this court to review the evidence and determine its
weight. But as this court stated in the recent Siberian
Elm case (Cannon -vs- Neuberger et ux. Utah, March
1954, 268 P2d 425) :
"However, much consideration 1nust he given
to the trial court's findings, inasmuch as the presiding judge saw an·d heard the witnesses, had a
better opportunity to determine their knowledge
of the fact testifie'd to, to observe their demeanor
indicating interest pr·ejudice, etc., and particularly
inasmuch as he went upon the premises in question, and m.ade first hand observation of cowditions existing. Kinsman v. Utah Gas and Coke
Co., 5·3 Utah 10, 177 P. 418. Kubby v. Hammond,
68 Ariz. 17, 198 P2d 134. Erickson v. Hudson,
70 Wyo. 317, 249 P2d 523. Smith v. Smith, Utah
262 P2d 284." (Emphasis added).
Never in the history of this court has there been a
reversal of a trial court's detern1ination upon the facts
that a nuisance is found not to exist. This is rightly so,
because the existence of a nuisance depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case "\vhich must be
weighed and evaluate·d by the fact finder. The location
of the property with respect to other industries, the
characterization of the area, the utility of the defendants'
conduct, its lawfulness and reasonable operation as compared to the type and gravity of harm to the plaintiff,
all must be considered.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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" . . . . the question whether the excessive
noises constitute a. nuisance or not would necessarily have to be determined as a question of fact
and not one of law." Twenty Second Corporation
of Church of J esus Christ of Latter Day Saints
-vs- Oregon Short Line Railroad Co., 36 Utah 238,
252, 103 P 243, 140 Am. St. Rep. 819, 23 L.R.A.,
N.S. 860.
1

As digested and sun1marized below the record in
this case fully supports the findings of fact that no legal
nuisance exists.
Industrialization of The Area

Within a radius of 500 feet of the center of Woods
Cross (intersection of 5th South ·street, which is numbered from Bountiful and Onion Street; See Defendants'
Exhibit No. 1) is one of the most highly industrialized
areas in the state of Utah. Within that area are the main
line tracks on the Union Pacific Railroad, ( T. 33) ; side
tracks for switching and for unloading all kinds of p·roducts from cement and lumber to oil, (T·. 34); the bulk
of the refinery of Phillips Petroleum Co., including a
tremendous "cat cracker"; the loading docks, garages
and storage tanks of Phillips, (T. 35); the heavily traveled Onion Street carrying a tremendous load of vehicles; the old abandoned building of a creamery, (T. 34);
two street and railroad intersections; each equipped
with bells and flashing lights for warning traffic, (T.
37); and the Droubay, Mitchell (T. 36) and W. S. Hatch
Co. garages for servicing tankers, trucks, trailers and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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semi-trailers. To the east a fe,v hundred feet and
crossing plaintiffs' property, will shortly be located the
ne'v express freeway, carrying the heavy traffic between
Ogden and Salt Lake City ('T. 46).
Defendants' Exhibit No. 6, (an aerial photopraph)
shows the Union Pacific tracks running from Salt Lake
(upper left hand corner) to Ogden (lower righ.t hand
corner). The Phillips Refinery and loading docks, and
the mainline Denver and Rio Grande tracks to the west
(T. 13) are also shown. Located in the general area is
a new General Motors plant, and the new terminal of
the Sinclair Refining Co. (T. 37). Mr. Glen Hatch was
asked on cross examination :
Q.

"Isn't it a fact then, Mr. Hatch, that your
home is surrounded on three sides virtually
by industrial use~

A.

"Well if you want to call that railroad industrial use, and this lease_9. property up
here, (pointing to W. S. Hatch Co.'s parking
lot), Y·es. '' ('T·. 36)

'This is the area. No fair-minded person visiting
Woods Cross would say it was not highly industrialized.
The trial court visited it and from his view, concluded
such to be th·e fact. (Memorandum Decision, p·aragraph
3, R. 9·; Findings of Fact, paragraph 4, R. 13).
Defendants have never claimed that this industrialization constitutes an absolute defense as a matter of
law in the instant case, but it does have an important
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bearing on vvhat is considered a reasonable amount of
noise and a reasonable use of property. The finding is
more than adequately supported by the record.
Phillips Petroleum Refinery and Loading Racks

Defendants' Exhibit No. 1 shows the location of the
Phillips Petroleum Co. refinery and its loading racks
for trucks on the northwest and southeast corners respectively of the intersection of 5th South Street with
Onion Street.
Mr. K. J. Haslam testified (T. 168) that he is District Traffic l\1ana.ger of Phillips Petroleum Co. and has
been an employee of the company for over five years;
that the rack for loading trucks hauling gasoline, diesel
fuel and light fuel oils is north of and almost adjacent
to the W. S. Hatch Co. place of business; that there are
t\vo loading racks, a new one being recently completed,
(T. 172). These loading racks are located 440 feet from
plaintiffs' house (Def's. Ex. No.1). Mr. Haslam testified
that Phillips has closed its refineries at Pocatello, Idah·o
and Spokane, Washington, and has compensated for
these shutdowns by increasing the capacity of its catalyctic cracking unit at Woods Cross to a possible 10,000
to 12,000 barrels of crude oil a day, ( T. 174).
The significance of this output is that 90 to 95 per
cent of the products moving by truck out of the entire
Phillips Refinery is loaded at th.ese racks, ( T. 173). In
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the summertime ap·proximately 100 truck~s in 24 hours
are loade-d out of the area, ('T. 173). The loading racks
operate around the clock during weekdays and special
loads are often taken on 'Sundays, (T. 173).
D·efendant's Exhibit No. 3 is a photograph of the
Phillips loading racks. The intervening weed patch is
property belonging to the plaintiffs, ( T. 43).
Onion 8treet Traffic

The presence of the Phillips Refinery and particularly the loading racks makes the area a hub for the truck
transportation of the refinery's products. F'rom plaintiffs' house to the center of Onion Street is 72 feet, (T.
129, Defs'. Ex. No. 1). W. T. Cannon testified that he
made a survey of all traffic, trucks, trains and automobiles passing in front of plaintiffs' house, and this survey
has been compile'd in bar graph form as defendants'
Exhibit No. 7. Th.e survey was taken for all 24 hours
of the day and night, but different periods of time were
covered on different days and even different months of
the summer of 1953, ('T. 131). It is representative of the
large volume of traffic traversing Onion Street.
The traffic survey in front of plaintiffs' house shows
that in an average 24 hour day, 904 automobiles and 124
double gear shift trucks passed the house. Each truck,
its owner, the direction in which it was proceeding and
the time of day (or night) are shown on Defendants'
Exhibit No. 8. All of these trucks. were required to either
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stop for stopsigns or for the railroad crossing signals,
and those trucks loaded and proceeding southerly would
be accelerating in a lorw gear when they passed within
72 feet of plaintiffs' premises. Such acceleration is much
noisier than the idling or normal running of a motor.
Union Pacific Railroad

The record shows that from plaintiffs' house to the
first rail of the mainline Union Pacific tracks is 195 feet.
It is 280 feet from plaintiffs' house to defendants' garage
(Defs'. Ex. No. 1). The traffic survey indicated that
during a 24 hour period there were a total of 42 trains
going north and south in front of plaintiffs' house, (T.
134), one between midnight and 1:00 A.M., another before 2 :00 A.M. and three between 2 :00 A.M. and 3 :00
A.M., etc., ( T'. 134). These trains create such a great
rumble and roar that while a long freight train is passing plaintiffs' house it is impossible for two persons

to carry on an ordinary conversation. It is the great
noise of the trains and truck traffic that primarily
prompted the trial court to state in paragraph 6 of its
Memorandum Decision:
''And it is the op1n1on of the court further
that to enjoin the defendants permanently in their
business activity would be highly unequitable
and would in fact destroy defendants' business,
and even if this W'as done, it would not diminish
to any appreciable degree the noises, confusion
and .smells which emarnate and exist in this immediate vicinity." (Emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mrs. Glen Hatch admitted that the trains could wake
her up at all hours of the night and that the truck traffic
was noisy and bothersome, (T. 42). In addition to the
passenger and freight trains going by, there were two
periods during the 24-hours of the survey when there
was switching in and out of th·e Phillips Petroleum Company. All trains set in motion the crossing signal and
bells, ('T. 15!5). All of the trains whistled for the crossing, however, Mrs. Hatch stated that the diesels have
changed their whistles, (T. 88). They now have more
the sound of a horn.
Other Garages in the Area
Defendants' Exhibit No. 2 is a photograph of the
l\1itchell Garage, which is about 495 feet from plaintiffs'
house. The exhibit illustrates the use of surrounding
property for the parking and storing of trucks and trailers. It is undisputed that the Mitchell and Drouhay
Garages perform the same type of servicing and repair
functions as performed by the defendant, W. S. Hatch
Co. Plaintiffs claim they are not bothered so much by
the noises coming from these garages but this does not
detract from the fact that surrounding the Phillips
loading dock, there is a cluster of garages designed to
facilitate the road transportation of both light fuel oils
and heavy black road oils. Regarding the many sources
of noise, Judge N orseth stated:
"'The court is not in a. position to determine
from the evidence ~n this case, or from the physical factors which are in evidence in the imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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n1ediate vicinity of the plaintiffs' home, (referring
to his view of the premises) 'vho is responsible for
the noises. and smells which emanate and exist.
It is the opinion of the court that each of the
businesses· referred to in paragraph- 3 (railroad,
Phillips loading dock and refinery and Droubay
and Mitchell garages) contributes to the noises
and sn1ells which exist." (R.. 10)
Necessity of Operating Defendant Company's
Business at Night
In its operation the defendant company owns approximately 45 pieces of equipment consisting of 20 diesel
tractors and/ or trucks and 25 trailers and/ or semi-trailers, ( T. 137-8, 9). In the summer season the company
employs between 40 and 45 men and at other seasons the
ernployees rnay get as low as 20 in number, (T. 179-180).
Plaintiffs primarily complained of the noises which
-vvere created by the repairing and servicing of W. S.
Hatch Co.'s trucks. They did state that the lights fron1
defendant co1npany's garage at night were bothersome,
but only passing mention was made of any odors. In
substance this case involves an alleged nuisance by reason
of noise. The defendants are aware that unnecessary loud
noises, particularly during the nighttime, can be disturbing. In Benjarnin vs. Lietz, llG Utah 476, 211 P2d 449,
the high \Vhining sound of a powerful planing 1nill at 2032
South lOth East was enjoined during sleeping hours by
the trial court and the decision was affirmed. The opinion states that the evidence showed the noises 'vere of
sufficient intensity to make normal conversations difSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ficult in plaintiffs' hon1es. In Thompson vs. Anderson,
107 Utah 331 153 P 2d 665 the Supreme Court affirmed
an injunction 'which forbade' the operation of a power saw,
the noise of sound equipment and amplifiers, a large
vacuum cleaner and loud talking and slamming of doors
during the nighttime. The nuisance occurred at No. 28
South 4th East, Salt Lake City, in the heart of a residential area. (The address is taken from respondent's brief
filed in the Supreme Court of Utah and found in Volume
556 of Abstracts and Briefs).
Therefore, defendants were very careful to explain
to the trial court why it was absolutely necessary that
defendant company's trucks he repaired and serviced during nighttime and the measures taken to keep all noises
to a minimum at night.
Mr. Haslam, District T'raffic Manager for Phillips,
testified that the defendant company is a common carrier
chiefly concerned with the transportation of "black oils"
used for road paving; that approximately 50 «yo of its business is hauling road oil used for road repairs and new
construction; that the business is seasonal because such
paving can only be accomplished in warm weather. Mr.
Haslam stated that in the summertime, refineries sucli.
as Utah Oil Refining Co. and Phillips Petroleum Co. are
hard-pressed to obtain sufficient transportation equipment to haul the black oils; that these companies contract
for th·e sale of road oil f.o.b. destination and then place
the order with common carriers such as W. S. Hatch Co.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for delivery, (T. 169). At the peak of the hot weather
season, shippers and road building contractors and everyone involved in road construction have to contend with
the shortage of equipment because it is physically impossible for any truck operator to keep on hand sufficient
equipment for the reason that the idle factor is so great
over the winter; that it is extremely important that all
available equip1nent be used to the maximum during the
road building season, (T. 169, 170).
Then

~Ir.

Haslam 'vas asked this question:

''Q.

Now, as a traffic man, what would you say
about the necessity of dispatching of trucks
during all hours of the night, where the haul
is into an area like eastern Nevada or southern Utah or southern Idaho, and the delivery
is to a road contractor~

A.

The trucks have to be dispatched on a 24hour basis. Otherwise the service of the operator would be of no value, no practical
value, beyond a very short radius. Source of
the supply for instance. For instance assuming we have a road job around Twin Falls,
or possibly Boise or some other place in
Idaho, and there is a tremendous volume of
asphalt moves to those areas out of Salt LakeWoods Cross region, the time of delivery on
that job deter1nines the time tha.t the truck
has to be dispatched from here, making proper allowance for loading time, reasonable
delays en route, weather conditions, and
everything considered, so that it arrives there
at the proper time, and that time isn't set by
just the contractor's whim or just because
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he happens to want it there at a particular
time, those road jobs are supervised by State
Road Engineers, or city, or whoever n1ay be
doing the work, and they tell us, when they
place their order, just exactly when they want
that truck to be there, and if it isn't there
he has a crew of men sitting around, sometimes at a cost of possibly in excess of $100.00
an hour while he is waiting for that truck
to show up. In addition to his expense the
State Engineer is on the joh and whoever
else may be involved." ('T. 170, 171)
The fact that W. S. Hatch Company must dispatch
son1e of its trucks at night is best illustrated by a typical
haul made by it to Wilkins, Nevada, in the summer of
1953, (T. 140). It is 215 miles from Salt Lake City to
Wilkins, Nevada, and requires approximately 7 hours
driving time for the truck to cover the distance. At this
location a 25-mile stretch of road was being constructed
with a plant-mix asphalt surface 36 feet wide, (T. 140).
Deliveries of road oil were made from 5 :00 A.M. to
12:00 noon. In dispatching its trucks to Wilkins, Nevada,
W. S. Hatch C'ompany was required to schedule one hour
for filling the truck at the loading rack of the refinery
and 7 hours driving time to the point of delivery (T. 141).
At this job as at all such jobs it was imperative that the
delivery of road oil not ·delay the construction crew in the
paving operation; that the oil be hot (between 180° and
380°) at delivery, ('T. 142). For these reasons the oil is
hauled in specially insulated tanks and cannot be stockSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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piled at the construction site. Defendants' Exhibits No.
9 and No. 10 are dispatch sheets for October 20 and J'uly
17, 1953, respectively. They typify such delivery.
The defendant company's operation requires. the servicing and n1aintenance of its trucks on a 24-h'our basis.
Frank C. Hughes, a -vvitness for the defendants and a
rnechanic for \V. S. Ifatch Co., testified that he had
\Vorked all shifts for the defendant company. Mr. Hughes
said:

"Q.

N o-vv suppose you take the peak of the season,
when road oil is being hauled heavily, in the
middle of the summer, will you tell the court
just what the shift lineup is and how many
employees -vvork, and when, in the shop~

A.

Well, at our peak this year we had three men
on dayshift, three men on afternoon or swing,
-vvhichever you want to call it, a.nd then we had
one man on graveyard.

Q. You only have one man on graveyard then,
even in the peak
A.

Yes."

season~

(T.100)

* * *
A.

Well, the major repair is done only in the
daytime. Because on major repair you never
know exactly what the job is until we get it
completely tore down, and the position we're
in out there, we've got so 1nany different
trucks, so many different models, we can't
have a stockroom, you know, to cover everything, so when we get it torn down the day-
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shift buys the parts, and the fellows that tear
it down is on the dayshift and they usually
p·ut it back together." (R. 101)
Method of Operation

·There is no dispute in the record, nor is there any
claim by plaintiffs that defendant company does anything more than make minor necessary repairs at night
and that it employs only one man at the peak of the season to work graveyard shift (from midnight till 8:00
A.M.) This man takes care of necessary greasing, tire
changes and minor repairs, (T. 101). In this connection
Mr. Hughes said that it is the mechanic's duty to check
over all trucks after they return from a trip and have
them in good, safe running order and "on the line" for
the driver when the latter reports for work, (T. 99).
Trucks are often brought in from one haul at 10 :00 or
11:00 P.M. and taken out on another trip at 3:00 or 4:00
A.M. \Vhen a truck driver returns from a trip he hits
all tires with a bar to see whether there are any flats.
He checks the oil, water, lights and tires, (T. 9·9). This is
normally done while the truck is being fueled at the fuel
pumps just north of the garage. The driver makes a note
of, and rep-orts any defective equipment to the mechanic.
If the stalls in the garage are not filled with other equipment, the truck is then driven therein headed east. It
has never been the custom to park trucks in the stalls
with the headlights facing westerly toward plaintiffs'
house, (T. 106). Once inside the garage the mechanic
checks for broken springs and the amount of grease in the
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transmission, (T. 100). Finally the truck is parked out
in the yard (the leased premises from Phillips to the east
of the garage) where it awaits the next trip.
Before a truck can be driven out on the road its motor
must be run for a:bout 20 minutes to build up air pressure
for the air brakes. But it is not idled nor raced in the
yard to warm up the motor, for the only way that a diesel
n1otor can be warmed up is to take it out on the road and
drive it at least four miles, (T. 102, 105).
Prior to 1952 it was sometimes very difficult to start
the diesel engines in the wintertime because of cold temperatures. This difficulty at times necessitated one truck
pushing or pulling another, ( T. 123) and caused some
noise. Since the winter of '5·2-53 an electrical device has
been employed which is a hot water heater, plugged into
an outdoor wall outlet and placed inside the radiator.
It keeps the radiator water warm and makes the engines
easy to start, (T. 101-102). It makes no noise whatsoever,
contrary to plaintiffs' apparent misinformation, (T. 28,
122).
With regard to floodlights, Mr. Hughes testified that
the company has no yard floodlights and that all night
work was done inside the garage "because men doing
mechanical work cannot work with a light in one h·and
and a 'vrench in the other." (T. 106). He also stated that
there has never been any steam cleaning of trucks after
dark at night, ( T. 107).
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Plaintiffs' counsel, on cross examination of Mr.
Hughes, elicited the fact that the grease gun is an airpower driven machine that makes a chugging noise.
"Just a quick air release is all it is. Just a
chug. One flip from one valve to another back and
forth." (T. 114)
~iinor

spot welding on tanks is p,erformed at the garage,
but all dents that have to be pounded out of the tanks
are sent to Fruehauf Co., W. S. Hatch Co. does not have
facilities for straightening dents, (T. 122).
Specific Noises Complained of and Their Rem,edy

\Vith reference to plaintiffs' specific complaints
have:

,,~e

(1) A claim of pounding a wheel wedge with a
sledge han1mer in order to get the huge truck tires off
the wheel. This difficult task of removing a tire from its
wheel used to be performed manually with a sledge hammer, but to lessen noise and reduce the labor involved,
defendant company purchased a pneumatic tire changer
which pushes the tire off the wheel noiselessly, (T. 110).

Noise fro1n a pneumatic grease gun. This is
the ordinary service station grease gun which emits a
chugging noise as the op·erator releases the air pressure.
Mr. W. S. Hatch sleeps in his residence immediately west
of the garage and he stated that at times he could hear
some pounding, but was never able to hear the grease
gun, (T. 188).
( 2)
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(3) _A_ hissing sound \vhen trucks are stearn cleaned.
Trucks are stean1 cleaned only in the daytime, ( T. 106).
( 4) 'The sound of truck 1notors which are idled or
raced. It is undisputed that a diesel motor cannot be
\Varined up by racing it. The idling of a diesel motor to
build up air p1·essure certainly cannot be considered
legally objectionable in view of the noise of the 42 trains
and the great n1any In ore truck engines which accelerate
in lo·w- gear vvhile passing 72 feet fron1 plaintiffs' house
on Onion Street.
General no1se~ fron1 within the shop. Both
\\~illard S. Hatch and the mechanic, Frank C. Hughes,
testified that all e1nployees are given strict orders to keep
the garage door~ dovvn, especially at night, in order to
1nini1nize any possible sounds, (T. 107, 184). Plaintiffs
contended that the doors \vere indiscriminately left open,
but the truth of this Inatter is revealed hy 1\fr. Hughes'
testirnony on cross exa1nination:
( 3)

'"Q. I think you said that you have had instructions to keep the doors down. Then how do
you comply \vith this so-called safety requirement of opening them up, and how often are
they opened and closed~

A.

Well, I don't know an thing about a safety
requirernent for opening and closing doors.
I just know when it gets too srnoky in there
for a man to stay in there.

Q.

Because you're running motors~
Can be welding. Cutting metal that has oil on

A.

it.
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I presume it's cooler with the doors open in
the summertime, isn't it~
A. We never got to experience that much this
summer on the night shift, because those
doors was closed just about all summer."
(T.11 5)
Q.

1

(6) ·Old tires, lumber and junk piled up along plaintiffs' boundary line. These items were all cleaned up
prior to trial, (T. 183). In an area where all sorts of
trucks, trailers and various other equipment are stored
(See Ex. No. 3) the p,resence of such objects do not
constitute an actionable nuisance. This complaint is an
indication of the aesthetical demands which plaintiffs
have made upon defendants in an area dominated by the
railroad and the refinery, et al. Plaintiffs even go so far
as to request this court to insure the p·ermanence of such
neatness by issuing a (mandatory) injunction (page 23 of
Appellants' Brief). It has always been defendants' chagrin that th.eir efforts to comply with plaintiffs' requests
and demands be interpreted not as an indication of willingness to cooperate but merely as an item of some guilt
on their part and triumph by plaintiffs. Of course, no
authority has been cited by plaintiffs to the effect that
an ·injunction will issue to insure a condition that has
already been voluntarily complied with.
(7) Lights shining upon plaintiffs' residence. The
garage building itself deflects all ceiling lights onto the
ground before they reach plaintiffs' residence. Frank
Hughes testified that lights inside of the shop can only
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be seen if a person is standing in line with the door,
(T. 116). The annoyance of the one or two wall lights
'vhich shine upon plaintiffs' house could be eliminated
by dark green shades or venetian blinds. Plaintiffs' contention, at page 22 of their brief, that a total wattage of
2850 to 3800 watts shines upon their home all night is
absurd. The witness, E. B. Rawlins, who lives in the next
house south of plaintiffs', stated that waste gas burning
atop the Phillips Refinery waste gas stack didn't bother
him in his house because he kept his shades drawn, but
at times he had been in his front yard at night when you
could almost read a newspaper by this burning of waste
gases at the refinery, (T. 162). The trial court stated
"that there was no evidence establishing that the defendants had operated large floodlights on the west of
their (garage) building in the nighttime," (memorandum
decision paragraph 4, R. 10) and found in its findings of
fact No. 5 ''that the truck headlights and fixed lights of
the defendants are not so maintained or used as to unreasonably interfere with the use by plaintiffs of their
residence," (R. 14-15).
(8)

Srnells.

Defendants submit that the record is

so barren of any complaint about odors that the voluminous citation of authorities in appellants' brief concerning this subject is completely lacking in factual basis.
The exhaust from Onion Street traffic and the burning
of waste gas at the Phillips refinery must be the source
of this fancied annoyance.
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DE,CIDED AS A MATTER OF FACT THAT NO ACTIONABLE NUISANCE EXISTS.

Plaintiffs have devoted the latter half of their brief
to a citation of authorities which hold that u1zere a nuisance in fa.ct is found to exist, it is no defense:
(a) That the business is conducted in a lawful, n1odern and efficient n1anner.
(b) That the noises are necessarily incident to the
business.
(c) That the parties are situated 1n an industrial
area.
(d) That the plaintiffs moved to the nuisance.
(Appellants' Brief, pages 41, 42)
Defendants have never clai1ned that, a.s a 1natter of
la,v, they were justified in continuing to maintain and
create an actionable nuisance because of the legal application of any of the above factors. No argument of this
kind vvas evt.:r 1nade to the trial court and such is not the
contention of respondents on appeal. These 1natters are
pleaded in defendants' Answer for the reason that their
presence or absence does have a decided influence in determining 'vhether or not a nuisance in fact n1ay be found
to exist.
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·The funda1nen tal issue in this case, as stated by the
trial court, is \vhether or not the operation of defendants'
business constitutes a nuisance. In reply to this question
defendants sub1nitted the follovving authorities to the
Trial Judge and repeat them for the benefit of this court.
They announce the universally accepted rule of lavv that
the creation of a reasonable a1nount of noise does not
constitute an actionable nuisance.
"There can be no fixed standard as to what
noise constitutes a nuisance, and the circurnstances
of the case must necessarily influ,ence the decision.
amownt to a nu.isa,nce, the noise m.~~;st be unrea,sonable in degree, and reasonableness in this
respect is .a q~testion of fact. No one is entitled
to a,bsohde q~tiet in the enjoyment of his property;
he rna.y only insist ~tpon a degree of quietness
consistent with the standard of comfort prevailing in th"e locality in which he d.wells. The location
and surroundings must be considered, since noise
\vhich amounts to a nuisance in one locality may
be entirely proper in another. The character and
magnitude of the industry or business complained
of and the manner in which it is conducted must
al~o be taken into consideration, and so must the
character and volume of the noise, the time and
duration of its occurrence, the number of people
affected by it, and all the facts and circurnstances
of the case." (emphasis added) \ 7 ol. 39 Arnerican
Jurisprudence, Nuisances, Section 47, page 331.

To

"Generally, noise is not ex necessitate a
nuisance even when disagreeable. It has been
stated that no one is entitled to absolute quiet in
the enjoyment of his property, but is limited to a
degree of quietness consistent with the standard
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of comfort prevailing in the locality in which he
dwells. Thus it has been held that as many useful
acts are necessarily attended with more or less
noise, reasonable noises in an appropriate locality
are not necessarily nuisances even though they are
disagreeable and annoying." 66 C.J.'S., Nuisances,
Sec. 22, Noise P. 772.
The s.upreme Court of lTtah in applying the above
stated rule of law reversed a judgment for damages allegedly caused by the bad smell, gas and smoke emitted
from defendants' refining operation in Da,hl v. Utah Oil
Refining Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 Pac. 269. The Court declared
the law in Utah to be, that:
''The right to recover damages for injuries
occasioned by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, foul air,
etc., being cast upon one's prop·erty by another,
in ~roper cases, is well established. But the rule
of liability is not absolute and the law does not
afford redress for every such discomfort or annoyance. Extreme rights in this regard cannot be
enforced. Of necessity some d:egree of inconvenience and anrnoyarnce rnust be endu.red or com1nunity and social life would' be i1npossible. It thus
follows that what constitutes in law an actionable
nuisance is al,vays a question of degree ... " (emphasis. added.)
"While a nuisance, in the ordinary sense in
which the word is used, is anything th-at produces
an annoyance-anything that disturbs one or is
offensive-in legal phraseology it is applied to
that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unla,yful use by a person
of his property. Every person has th·e right to the
reasonable enjoyment of his property. As to what
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is a reasonable use of one's property must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case,
for a use for a particular purpose and in a particular way, in one locality, that would be lawful
and reasonable might be unlawful and a nuisance
in another. I Wood on Nuisances (3d Ed.) Sec.
1, 2."
This Court IS aware that the volume and type of
noises that may he considered unreasonable has under 7
gone a steady change which evolution has coincided with
the increased development of industry throughout the
country. Thus in Hann:u,m v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 31 Atl.
2d 99, it was said:
"No word is used more frequently in discussing these cases than the word ''reasonable" and no
word is less susceptible of exact definition . . .
Noises which in the preindustrial era would have
been considered intolerably unreasonable are now
tolerated as reasonable. The noise and smoke of
railroad trains frequently passing human habitations is not now considered unreasonable although
an equal amount of noise and smoke would doubtless at an earlier time have been considered unreasonable. That a certain amount of s1noke
fumes, gases and noises will necessarily be produced and emitted by manufacturing plants is inevitable, but that persons who dwell near manufacturing plants like persons who dwell near railroads or on busy city streets must put up with a
certain amount of resulting annoyance and discomfort is self-evident. The prosperity of an industrial community depends on its industrial activities, and it would be inconsistent with ,sound
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hest of a comparatively fe,v 'vho are an~oy.ed
thereby ... A certain amount of noise also IS Inseparable from industrial activity. The burdens
of prosperity must be taken with its benefits."
Throughout the p-resentation of this case defendants
have contended that what they are doing is R·EASONABLE under the above authorities; that the operation is
made 1nore reasonable by reason of the fact that it is
la,vful in the first place (not an outla,ved business under
the zoning ordinances) ; that it is conducted in a modern
and efficient 1nanner and hence unreasonable noises have
been eliminated. The location in the industrial area does
affect the amount of noise that can reasonably be expected to exist. Plaintiffs' expensive re1nodeling 'vas pleaded
bee a use it indicates the fastidiousness of their demands.
They themselves are obliged to be reasonable under all
the circurnstances.
In the Restatement of the La'v on Torts, Sections 826
to 828 inclusive, the authors of the treatise on nuisances
have stated that a determination of 'vhether or not an
actionable nuisance exists, that is whether the acts complained of are reasonable or unreasonable, depends upon
an evaluation of many factors. The authors conclude
that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a clain1ed
nuisance depends upon weighing ''the graYity of the
harm" to the plaintiff against "the utility of the actor's
(defendants') conduct." In comment ''b" and "c" to
Section 826, it is stated:
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~'b.

The point of ·ciew. The unreasonableness of an intentional invasion is detern1ined from
an objective point of view. The question is not
"Thether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's or
defendant's position would regard the invasion as
unreasonable, but whether reasonable persons
generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively, would consider it unreasonable. Regard n1ust be had not only for the interests of the person harn1ed but also for the interests of the actor and for the interests of the con1munity as a whole. Deter1nining unreasonableness
is essentially a \veighing process, involving a comparative evaluation of conflicting interests in various situations according to objective legal standards.
~'c.

'Gra.vity' of haTJn and 'utility' of co1~
duct. The terms 'gravity' and 'utility' are used
in the Restate1nent of this Subject to express the
legal evaluation of har1n and conduct. The gravity
of harm is its seriousness fron1 the objective,
legal standpoint, while the utility of conduct is its
rneritoriousness fron1 the san1e standpoint. The
gravity or seriousness of harn1 fro1n a legal standpoint is not necessarily the sarne as its seriousness fro1n the standpoint of the person harrned .
. _.\._ person Inight, for exan1ple, regard personal discornfort or annoyance as a 1nore serious harm to
himself than the destruction of son1e tangible object on his land, whereas the legal serio1tsness or
gra1;ity of harm throt~Jgh destruction of physica.Z
things is generally grea.ter than tlze .rrra vity of
harnt through mere annoyance or discon1jort."
(emphasis added.)
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The Restate1nent then sets forth the follo,ving factors
which are to be considered in 'veighing the "gravity of the
harm" against "the utility of conduct."
"·S·ec. 827. GR.AVITY OF. HARM-FACTORS
INVOLVED.
In determining the gravity of the harn1 from an
intentional invasion of another's interest in the
use and enjoyment of land, the following factors
are to he considered:
r(a)

the extent of the harm involved;

(b) the character of the harm involved;
1

(c) the social value which the law attaches
to the typ-e of use or enjoyment invaded;

(d) the suitability of the particular use or
· enjoyment invaded to the character of the
locality;
'(e) the burden on the person harmed of
avoiding th·e harm."
"Sec. 828. U'TILITY OiF' CONDUC·T TORS IN"'\TOL VED.

F·AC-

In determining the utility of conduct 'vhich causes
an intentional invasion of another's interest in the
use and enjo~"'lnent of land, the following factors
are important:
(a) social value "\Vhich the law attaches to the
primary purpose of the conduct;
(b) suitability of the conduct to the ch.aracter
of the locality;
(c) impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion."
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G.ravity of Harm to Plaintiff

The R-estate1nent rule as set forth above is appropriate and applicable to the instant case. It would be proper
for this Court, in order to arrive at an equitable decision,
to weigh these factors as the trial court did, giving due
consideration to the fact that the Trial Judge observed
the 'vitnesses' demeanor, viewed the premises and witnessed the deinonstration of the defendants' equipment at
their garage. The Restateinent forn1ula allows the court
to 'veigh the gravity of the harm or the seriousness of
the noises and lights of which the plaintiffs complaip.
against the utility of defendants' trucking business being
conducted in the manner, place and for the purposes
enun1erated.
It should be noted that plaintiff has not cited any
Utah cases nor any authority from other jurisdictions
"~hich hold that noise and lights amount to an actionable,
nuisance in an industrial area such as the neighborhood
involved herein. The Utah case of Tho1npson v. Anderson, 107 Utah 331, 153 P. 2d 665, occurred near South
Temple at No. 28 South, 4th East Street, ·salt Lake City,
Utah, and involved the defendants' use of a sound truck
with loud speakers, which noise in plaintiff's opinion was
nine times louder than a radio. This use of the sound
truck and hammering and slamming noises incident

to the furniture repair business and use of a large vacuum cleaner which gave off a shrill, long, dreary whistle
'vas enjoined by the Trial Court during the nighttime.
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The in1portant features of that case are that it was not
sho,vn that it "\vas necessary for the noises to occur during
the nighttin1e and the case involved a residential section
of Salt Lake City, \vhich \vas very quiet except for the
noise crt:·ated by defendants. Also in BcnjaHzin c. Lietz.
116 Utah 4-76, 211 P. 2d -±49, the S.upre1ne Court correctly
affir1ned an injunctive order which prohibited the defendant fro1n operating a planing n1ill situated at 2032 South
lOth East Street, Salt Lake Cit~T' after the hour of 6:00
p.n1. on vveek days and all day on Sundays. The residential area involved, the absence of other sources of
noise and the non-necessity of operating during the nighttune Inake it clearly apparent "\vhy these cases cannot be
considered as a binding precedent in the instant dispute.
Each case 1nust be deter1nined upon its own facts.
The extent of the har1n involved in this case is limited to a distance of less than 300 feet. The only persons
co1nplaining in this generally noisy neighborhood bordering the railroad tracks are the brother and sister-in-law·
of the defendant, \Villard S. Hatch. nir. R.a,vlings, w·ho
lives in the first house south of the plaintiffs, says that
the big,gest noise disturbance co1nes fron1 trains and
trucks that pass along Onion Street in front of his house,
(T. lG-±); that the burning waste gas as the Phillips Refinery is so bright at times that he can read a newspaper
in his front yard at night, (T. 162). The trial court at
'
the tin1e of its visit to the pre1nises, heard th'e noises
1nade by the pounding of a hanuner on a truck and bY a
diesel tractor being driven about the yard. It conrluded
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that the noises created hy defendants' operations were in~ignificant in eo1nparison \vith the noises caused by the
h~avy truck travel along Onion Street, \vhich is four
ti1nes as close to plaintiffs' house, and especially the 42
trains \Yhich pass daily \Yithin 195 feet fro1n plaintiffs'
house.
The har111 caused to plaintiffs can only be considered
graYe if the eli1nination of the noise \Vould leave plaintiffs \vith a rneasurable a1nount of relief. The Trial Court
coneluded that:
"' ... even if this \vas done (enjoin the defendants'
business activities) it \vould not diminish to any
appreciable degree the noises, confusion and
s1nells "Thich emanate and exist in this i1n1nediate
vicinity." (R. 10)
..:\s for the old tires, batteries, hunher and eoncrete
blocks \\~hich \Yere piled along the ea~t boundary line of
plaintiffs' property (290 feet fron1 plaintiffs' house<·lcaned up in the sun1n1er of 1953) and \Yhich \vere alleged to constitute an eyesore and a nuisance, the rule
is that:

"The fact that a thing is unsightly, or that it
offends the aesthetic sense, 1~ not in itself sufficient to ruake it a nuisance. It has been held,
however, that while unsightly things are not to be
banned solely on that account, they should be
properly placed and not so located as to be unduly
offensive to the neighbors or the publie, and that
the fact that a thing is unsightly and offensive
to the view of average persons 1uay alone rnake
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it a nuisance "\varranting equitable interference,
where it is located in a resid.ential district.'' (emphasis added) \Tol. 39, Am. Jur., Nuisances, Sec.
29, Unsightliness.
Instead of adjusting to the industrial progress of
the Woods Cross community, the plaintiffs in effect seek
to have the court turn the community back to a rural
state. Plaintiff Glen A. Hatch testified that in 1951 he
remodelled his house, and that the cost of this improvement was $22,000.00 or $23,000.00, (T. 4). The extensive
remodeling of plaintiffs' house in the face of the development of the area is a most unusual and difficult thing
to understand. Particularly is this true "\Vhen at the same
time plaintiffs seek to impose their claiined financial
loss upon the defendants. Of course plaintiffs had the
right to remodel their home. No one denies that fact.
In doing so they were fully aware of the industrial
character of Woods Cross, that the area would becon1e
further industrialized. Notwithstanding this knowledge
they elected to reconstruct their hon1e at large expense.
They must have concluded that continuing to live at their
location on Onion Street overshadowed in value to the1n
the disadvantages fro1n living in the industrial area.
Plaintiffs cannot build a beautiful home in an industrial
area and then say that they are not to be disturbed.
Plaintiffs have the duty of 1naking reasonable efforts to
adjust to the conditions under which they live:
"IThe harm involved in an intentional invasion
of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of
land can sometimes be partially or wholly avoided
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by the other. In 1nost cases, however, the avoidance of one har1n involves another in the form of
experience and inconvenience, for the burden involved in avoiding is often as great as that sought
to be a voided. Nevertheless, there are some si tuations in vvhich one can avoid most of the harm
from an interference with his use or enjoyment of
land with very little trouble or expense. For example, one may be able by closing the windows in
his buildin.g to shut out uutch of the noise or
s1noke from his neighbor's activities. In such
cases the gravity of the harm is less than it would
be if the harm were unavoidable or could only be
avoided with difficulty. . . This factor of the
burden to the person harn1ed of avoiding the
harm is not often decisive as to gravity. It merely
embodies the common sense idea that persons
living in society must make a reasonable effort
to adjust their uses of land to those of their fellovvmen before complaining that they are being unreasonably interfered with in what they are doing." Comment on Clause (e) of Restatement Rule
827. (emphasis added)
Utility of Defendants' Conduct

As for the utility of defendants' conduct, the suitability of the road oil transportation business to the
locality here involved is obvious. There is no place in
Davis County better suited to the location of the W. S.
Hatch Company's place of business. The social value
\vhich the lavv attaches to the purpose of defendants'
business is important. In our present era of building
new roads, the transportation of road oil fro1n the refinery to the construction site is a necessary and valuable
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social contribution. F·actor "c" of the Restatement rule
828 takes into consideration the i1npracticability of preventing or aYoiding the noises and lights of \vhich plaintiffs co1nplain. It is undisputed: that it is in1possible
to limit the operation of defendants' business to the daytin1e only ; that the necessity of delivering hot road oil
at a construction site 1nany Iniles distant fron1 Salt Lake
City requires the operation of defendants' garage
throughout the nighttin1e. The changing of tires, greasing of trucks and 1naking 1ninor repairs during the graveyard shift are so necessar~T to the business that to enjoin
the noises incident to these operations \Vould in effect
enjoin the operation itself.
The occasional tunes at \vhich lights shine on plaintiffs' house cannot be considered n1ore objectionable than
the lights \vhich shine on plaintiffs' house coming fro1n
trucks driving up and dovvn Onion Street. The traffie
survey sho\vs the 1nany trucks \Vhich driYe past plaintiffs' house during the nightti1ne. Flrank Hughes testified
that on a nor1nal night 5 or 6 trucks go through the shop.
In contrast, in a continuous 24 hour period, 124 double
gear shift trucks, 904 auto1nobiles and 4~ trains passed
\Yithin 72 feet to 195 feet of plaintiffs' house, (T. 13-!,
and Defs'. Exhibit 7).
It is the general rule that a serv1ce station or a
public garage located 1n a residential area is not considered a nuisance unless operated in an arbitrarv and
ol
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ly the noise fron1 the pneun1a tic grease gun and pneulnatic tire ren1over at the W. S. Hatch Co.'s garage cannot be considered unreasonable when con1pared with the
noise of trains and trucks passing plaintiffs' house. Considered fron1 the objective point of view the utility of the
activity \vhich produce these noises is far 1nore important
and far overshadows plaintiffs' con1plaints and their desire to be free fro1n such noise.
In \T olun1e 39 American Juris prudence, Section 47
on Nuisances, it is stated that:

'"NO ONE IS ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE QUIET."
Reasonableness of the noise caused by the defendant
co1npany's operations n1ust be 1neasured by the amount
of noise other\vise present to disturb plaintiffs.
~ ·vve have no doubt the appellants have been
and are annoyed by the noise and vibration of
defendants' machinery. But the business of the
latter is a lawful one, and the noises referred to
appear to be an inseparable and necessary incident thereof. It is not alleged that they are
either negligent or malicious in their manner of
conducting their business. It is an i1nportant
feature in the case that their works are located
in a neighborhood exclusively devoted to manufacturing purposes. In such a location there must
necessarily be much noise and jarring caused by
the operation of the 1nachinery, with perhaps
smoke and unsavory smells, the result of the various industries. Admittedly the business of the.
appellant has not suffered by reason of the acts
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co1nplained of and so far as the annoyances are
concerned the~ are to be expected in such a neighborhood a~d must he endured with the best grace
possible unless valuable industries are to be
sacrificed for the sake of quiet." Straus v. Barn·ett, 140 Pa. 111, 21 Atl. 253
·Plaintiffs have quoted from a number of cases without stating the facts of the case upon "\vhich basis the
court's language was 1neant to apply. They atten1pt to
reverse the trial court's determination that no nuisance
exists, upon the authority of such Utah cases as Brough
v. Ute Sta1npede Ass'n. 105 Utah 446, 142 P2d 670;
Ludlow v. Colorad:o Ani1nal By-Produ.cts Co., 104 Utah
221, 137. P2d 347, and the two Salt Lake City noise cases
above referred to (Benda.min v. Lietz, planing mill;
Thom.pson v. Anderson., radio equipment and loudspeaker).
The noises created by W. S. Hatch Co.'s business
cannot be con1pared to the widespread fetid stench of
the animal carcass rendering plant owned by Colorado
Animal By-Products Co. Nor is there any sin1ilarity
in the decision enjoining the Ute Sta1npede Ass'n. fron1
using the street in front of plaintiffs' pre1nises for its
carnival and thereby creating a situation "There noisy
cro,vds of people blocked plaintiff's driveway, used vulgar language and entered the pren1ises for p-rivate purposes, leaving e1npty liquor bottles and contraceptives
th.ereon. Each case 1nust be determined upon the basis
of WH.&T I'S REASONABLE considering all the circumstances involved in each particular situation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37
Plaintiffs cite and rely extensively on the case of
Qu.inn r ...JJnerican Spiral Spring & Mfg. Co. 293 Pa 152,
1-±1 Atl. 855, 61 ALR 9'18, primarily for the proposition
that defendants "1nust reduce the noises to the very
1ninin1un1 \Yhich can be procured, even if it is necessary
to spend n1ore u1oney in doing so than the appellants'
property is \Yorth." (page 1-± of appellants' brief). They
state at page 23 of their brief that an order should be
issued requiring defendants to 1nove or change the location of their garage, referring again to the Quinn case.
The Quinn case is markedly distinguishable as a
nzatter of lau·! There the trial court did find as a matter
of fact that an actionable nuisance existed but dismissed
plaintiff's bill for an injunction and limited him to a
recovery at law for whatever damages he had suffered:
"(2) because more harm would be done by
granting than by refusing an injunction;"
The evidence in the Quinn case showed that plaintiff \Vas totally blind and lived alone in his residence;
that defendant's president told him they were going to
build a plant next door which would 1nake a noise and
cause so1ne annoyance to him; that defendant offered
to buy his property but would not allow anything for
the building on it and consequently plaintiff refused to
sell; that defendants built their plant and located the
largest and heaviest pieces of Inachinery un.necessarily
close to plaintiff's dwelling; that the vibration imparted
to plaintiff's house by the operation of the heavy 1nachi-
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nery "'\Tas so great that pictures and other articles \vere
shaken fron1 tables, \valls and Inantelpieces, plaster fell
from the -vvalls and ceilings, and on one occasion a brick
fell fron1 the chin1ney." The trial court found that "the
vibrations and noises are unpleasant and at times cause
a nervous shock to those living within the house and
they seriously interfere \vith the comfort and enjoyn1ent
of plaintiff's residence as a dwelling house." But the
trial court denied plaintiff equitable relief for the reason
that it would be 1nore expensive ($12,000) for defendant
to relocate the 1nachinery than to purchase plaintiff's
property and house. This, said the appellate court, is
an insufficient reason, for \vhere a nuisance in fact is
found to exist it cannot "n1ake the slightest difference
that the plaintiff's property is of insignificant value to
him as con1pared \vith the advantages that \vould accrue
to the defendants fron1 its occupation." Defendants haYe
no quarrel with the principle announced in this case, but
the facts are totally different. There a nuisance \vas
found to exist by the lo\ver court.
This court should adhere to the reasoning of its o\vn
decisions as enunciated in Da.hl1:. Utah Oil Refining Co.
71 Utah 1, 262 Pac 269, wherein it was stated:
''·Of necessitr some degree of inconvenience
and annoyance n1ust be endured or con1n1unitv
and social life \Vould be i1npossible. It thus follo\\T.s
that \vhat constitutes in la\v an actionable nu 18 _
ance is always a question of degree ....
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"' ... The test of whether the use of the property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness
of the use complained of in the particular locality
and in the 1nanner and under the circumstances
of the case."
Thus, in Coon v. Utah Construction Co. 228 P2d 997,
the conclusion of the trial court was affirmed that no
actionable nuisance existed although findings of fact
\Vere entered that the plaintiffs were annoyed by the
operation of the defendant's Euclid trucks upon the
high,vay adjacent to plaintiff's house.
Plaintiffs claim that their action is brought under
the authority of 78-38-1 U.C.A. 1953, but as pointed out
in the Siberian Eln1 case (Cannon u. Neuberger 268 P2d
4:25) this statute has never been interpreted by this court

"to mean 'anything a,t all \vhich (is) ,anv
person considers to be offensire to the senses,'
etc. Rather it has held that the term 'nuisance'
is applied to 'the 1tn rca.sonabl e, unwarrantable or
nnlaufnl use by a person of his property ... "
(page 425)
Defendant Co1npany demonstrated and the trial
court heard the noises produced by the operation of the
pneun1a tj c grease gun and tire changer, the pounding
on the trucks and a diesel tractor being driven about the
~~ard.

This first hand opportunity to judge the intensity

and volu1ne of the sounds produced convinced the trial
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cessively loud, nor unnecessarily created. As stated in
Kinsman et al 'i~. []tah Gas & Coke Co. 53 Utah 10, 177
Pac. 418:
" . . . greater consideration should be given
to the court's finding by reason of the court's
opportunity in visiting the plant and vicinity and
seeing fro1n personal investigation and observation the conditions that exist there, and determining whether or not such offensive odors,
fumes, etc., do emanate from and are allowed to
escape from, defendants' plant, and whether the
same p·ern1eate the air about and enter the ho1nes
of the plaintiffs to such an extent as to render
said pren1ises uncomfortable and unfit for residential purposes."
The defendant co1npany and its president, Willard
S. Hatch, have 1nade every reasonable effort to keep the
sounds at a 1ninimun1 that might disturb plaintiffs. All
1najor repairs are made during the daytime. A single
1nechanic is e1nployed on the graveyard shift, and his
duties are lilnited to inspections and necessary tire
changes. Pounding rarely occurs at night and then only
when it is necessary to fix a broken spring or 1nake son1e
1ninor repair. ''Tillard S. Hatch has directed the mechanics to keep the garage doors down, although at times
fumes fro1n l\'"elding beco1ne so severe it is necessary to
open the doors for ventilation. The purchase of the
electric hot starts which are placed in the truck radiators have lessened the noise in starting the diesel motors.
The co1npany e1nployees have all been instructed to refrain fron1 steam cleaning trucks or trailers after dark.
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The purchase of the pneu1na tic tire changer has eliminated 'vhat was at that ti1ne the 1nost objectionable source
of noises fron1 pounding the wheel wedge with a sledge
ham1ner. Defendant cleaned up the tires piled next to
plaintiffs' boundary line but in spite of all their efforts,
plaintiffs continued to 1nake more and greater demands.
Frank Hughes testified that one night between midnight
and 1:00 A.l\L he was alone at the garage when Mr. Glen
Hatch called him on the telephone.

"A.

The telephone rang and I ans,vered, and he
asked me what was going on over there, and
I said nothing. I was in the shop. Wasn't a
soul moving nowhere. I hadn't heard any
no1se.

Q. What did he

say~

A.

He said we was making so 1nuch noise over
there we was disturbing his sleep over there,
and his wife was about ready to go mad.

Q.

Was there any noise at all being made in the
shop~

A.

Not in the shop, because I was the only employee there·.

Q.

Or on the premises, to your

A.

To 1ny knowledge there \vas no one else on
the premises.

Q.

Do you know whether any noise was coming
from any other source that Inight have been
irritating ~

A.

If they had I never noticed it." (T. 109)

knowledge~
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Plaintiffs are Hypersensitive to
Defendants' Activities

It was obvious to the trial court that Edith E. Hatch
was vindictive in the manner that she testified. She
stated that the hmn fro1n the refinery did not bother her,
( T. 81) and that she got used to the noise fron1 the trains,
('T. 84) and truck8. She attributed all her ills and nervousness to the activities of the defendants and upon
cross-exan1ination indicated her animosity to,vard 1\fr.
W. S. Hatch.

"Q.

N O\Y when you've complained to 1\Ir. W. S.
Hatch about matters, he's tried to alleviate
the situation, hasn't he~

A.

He certainly has not. If he has he didn't do
much.

Q.

He's tried to be a good neighbor, has he not?
You don't think that he delights in keeping
you awake at nigh.t, do you~

A.

Why should

I~"

(T. 87)

Her stubborn attitude and den1anding nature \yere
evidenced by her testimony concerning the "'veed patch'~
'vhich plaintiffs O\Yn on the north side of defendants~
property. See Defendants' Exhibit No. 3.

"Q.

Have you seen the fire hazardous condition
in your own property, there to the north~

A.

D'O you know why that's

Q.

Have you seen

A.

You call that very fire

there~

that~

hazardous~
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THE COURT:

~Irs.

Hatch, answer his question.

Q.

Have you seen that condition~

A.

I've passed by it.

Q.

Now I'd like to have you tell me why it's
there, if you \va.nt to.

A.

You better let somebody else tell you then
maybe.

~IR.

MOYLE: You may answer.

A.

Shall I tell hin1 ~

MR.

~fOYLE:

A.

Yes.

All right. We tried to get Phillips to clean
up this corner here. It was dangerous. If it
had caught on fire \Vhy it \vould have cleaned
out the orchard, and we asked Phillips would
they clean that. They didn't do anything
about it. They came this year and asked and
we said clean half, clean up that corner over
there and we will clean up ours. This is the
first summer that there has ever been left.
Other summers it hasn't been there.

Q. In other words Phillips wanted to clean that
fire hazard though, in the north, and you have
placed a condition on it that something else
be done before you pern1it that; is that right~
A. They didn't clean theirs. What was the difference in ours and theirs'~ As far as fire
hazard~

Q. Did Phillips tell you that was
A. They didn't say so, no.

hazardous~

Q. They wanted it cleaned up 1
A. ·They didn't say it \Vas hazardous.
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~fR.

WILKINS: That's all.
MR. MOYLE: That's all." (T. 88, 89)

Plaintiffs in their brief (page 13) state that:
"If there is any animosity and hard feelings,
it ap·pears to originate with the respondent W. S.
Hatch, who admitted that he had made certain
implied threats when appellants complained to
him regarding the noise." (R. 192, 193).
What is construed by plaintiffs as an i1nplied threat
is the statement of W. S. Hatch:

"Q. Do you recall a telephone conversation that
you had with your brother Glen last summer,
when you stated in substance or effect that
if Glen was not satisfied with the way you
are running the business that you'd re-open
the driveway between the homes and run
your trucks through there again~
A.

He said that I had never coop·erated with
him, never done anything to lessen the noise,
and I says, "Well, what about leaving the
driveway~ Do you want us to go back up
the driveway again f' (between the parties'
houses). That was an ans,ver to his stating
we didn't cooperate. He don't give us any
credit for n1oving out of that lane, and getting
as far out as we can.

Q.

It wasn't intended then as a threat to reop·en it?

A.

No." ('T. 192)

Incidentally

,Y.

S. Hatch owns one-h.alf of the driveway.
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_A_s this court \Vell knows, it takes tvvro people to 1nake
a scrap. Defendant W. S. Hatch does not deny that he
is presently upset and peeved about being sued by his
brother. After a history of repeated de1nands for greater
quiet and futile atte1npts to satisfy plaintiffs' whims,
it is apparent that plaintiffs hope to drive defendants'
business completely out of the area; see particularly the
Transcript of Testimony at pages 188, 189. Th-e filing
of the cornplaint by one brother against another seeking
an injunction and $20,000 damages is evidence of aniInosity, and when the trial court listened to the noises
that were the subject of the suit, it concluded that the
plaintiffs Inust be hypersensitive to single out for complaint such a Ininor contribution to the sum total. The
trial court's finding that the plaintiffs are supersensitive to the defendants' activities and that this supersensitiveness is occasioned by the animosity between the
plaintiffs and the defendant Willard S. Hatch is amply
sustained by the record.
In Tortorella v. H. Tra.iser & Co., 28-l: Mass. 49'7, 188
N. E. 25-±, 90 ALR 1203, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed a judgment dismissing a complaint to
enjoin the operation of machinery alleged to constitute a
nuisance.
"A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance (citing cases) but it must be a noise whieh
affects injuriously the health or coinfort of ordinary people in the vieinity to an unreasonable
extent. Injury to a partieular person in a peeuliar
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position or of specially sensitive clul,ract.eristics
will not render the noise an actionable nuzsa;nce."
(emphasis added)
This rule relating to the materiality in a nuisance
case of special sensitive characteristics on the part of the
plaintiffs is expressed in Section 31 of \-r ollune 39, An1erican Jurisprudence on Nuisances:
"Effect on Persons of Ordinary Habits a.nd
Sensibilities. -The criterion for determining
whether a particular annoyance or inconvenience
is sufficient to constitute a nuisance is its effect
upon an ordinarily reasonable man, - that is,
a normal person of ordinary h'abits and sensibilities, - and not its effect up:on supersensitive
persons, those of too fastidious tastes, those in
ill health, afflicted with disease or abnormal physical conditions, or, on the other hand, those who
are hardened or inured to annoyances or disturbances of the kind in question .... "

The n1anner in which plaintiffs belittled the obviously noisier truck traffic on Onion Street and the rumbling
din of the passing trains supports the opinion of the
trial court "that the plaintiffs are hypersensitive to
defendants' activities ... "

NO PROPER FOUNDATION WAS LAID BEFORE THE
WITNESS, GLEN A. HATCH, WAS ASKED TO S'TATE HIS
CONCLUSION AS TO DEPRECIATION IN HIS RESIDENCE
PROPERTY VALUE.
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THE COURT PROPERLY STRUCK THE TESTIMONY
OF CHARLES A. LARSON BECAUSE OF HIS TOTAL LACK
OF KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING DEFENDANTS' OPERATIONS.

Plaintiffs cite in their brief the lTtah case of Ludlow
vs. Colorado Anima,Z By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137

P2d 347, "\vhich expresses the correct rule of damages to
be applied where there are Inultiple sources of smells or
noise, etc.; to-\vit, "the difference in 1narket value of each
tract \Vith its improvements without the stench nuisance
existing as con1pared with the value as affected by such
odors."
The question asked Glen A. Hatch and the objection
n1ade were as follows:
"Q.

~IR.

And what a1nount in your opinion \vould your
residence property be depreciated in the event
that this nuisance should continue unabated~
WILKINS: Now I object to that question,
no foundation having been laid for any answer from the witness.

THE ,COURT: I'll sustain the objection.
MR. MOYLE : I think Your l-Ion or should take
into consideration the fact that he is also an
owner of the property.
THE C·OURT: Well, I think the objection is well
taken to the question at this time. You 1nay
qualify if you can do so. You may qualify
or do as you like, if you want to do so.
~IR.

MOYLE: I won't attempt to go further.
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THE COURT: You can connect it up further on
if you'd like.
~IR.. MOYLE: I n1ay be able to do that."

The objection was made because plaintiff's counsel
did not lay a proper foundation for the witness to answer
the question. The witness was simply asked to state his
conclusion as to ho"\v much the p-roperty 'vould depreciate
if the claimed nuisance should continue unabated. This
is a far different question than one which would be based
upon market value without the nuisance as compared
with market value under the nuisance. The court attempted to guide counsel in reframing the question,
stating that the witness would be allowed to ans,ver with
the pToper basis shown, but the matter was dropped.
With reference to the witness, Charles A. Larson,
there would have been two grave errors co1nmitted by the
court had the court permitteu the witness' testimony to
stand. These errors are: (1) The witness 'vas so confused about the operations and noises involved and the
properties being referred to that there could have been
no reliance upon any values or amount of damages that
he might h·ave fixed. For example; (a) He thought the
Mitchell and Droubay Garages and parking lots belonged
to defendants, (T. 52). (b) He was not familiar with
the new Phillips loading rack located to the north of the
defendants' prop·erty, ('T. 52). (c) He assumed that oils
are loaded upon the defendants' p·roperty, (T. 57) and
based son1e of his determinations upon that assumption,
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\vhen as a 1natter of fact no oils are there loaded, (T. 59).
(d) He \Vas unable to give any breakdown as to the
contributing factors in depreciating the property such
as the railroad, the Phillips Refinery, and the other industries in the area. It was evident that this so called
expert had u1ade only a cursory examination of the area
involved and \vas not sufficiently fa1niliar \vith it to
testify as to w·hat activities defendant controlled and
\Yhat its contribution to the sun1 total of noises amounted
to.
( 2) Aside fro1n all this, ho\vever, the witness \Vas not
testifying as to market values but was testifying as to
''replacement costs."

"Q.

Now when you fix the replacement value that
value didn't take into consideration the fact
that on July 9, 1953, that W. S. Hatch was
already operating th.ere, did it~

. A..

No. That was replacernent value.

Q.

So you don't mean to say that that was the
value of the property as of that date?

A.

I said that was a replace1nent value.

Q.

That's nothing but a contractor's constructing figure, isn't it?

A.

That's right." (T. 65)

This witness was unable to g1ve any figure that
would rnake proper allowance for the variation in rnarket
values due to the numerous industrial influences in the
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neighborhood. As a 1natter of fact defendants atten1pted
to have this \Yitness give a breakdown on the contributing
factors influencing value and he finally confessed that
he could not do so.
"Q.

Well then, you can't give 1ne any overall
breakdown. Is that what it comes down to?

A.

Just an estimate. What I thought the house
could sell for with all of those in there in a
lump sum.

Q.

Well, can you break them down or can't

A.

I cannot break them do,vn right now." (T. 69)

you~

As a matter of fact this witness testified that land
values would increase with industrialization.

''Q. Are you familiar with the new highway that
is pTojected at the back that's going across
there~

A.

I don't know the location of it. Just general.
Q. Well, let's assume that its about 1200 feet
from the- garage of W. ·s. Hatch up to the
center line of the new highway. 'Vould that
have an influence if that freeway co1nes
through, \Yould that have an influence on
values~

A.

I think that''s going to help all that lower
country become 1nore industry.
Q. The future of this area is industry isn't it,
Mr. Larson~
A. I think so.
Q.

A.

It's not residential~
I think not.
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Q.

It beca1ne that way not through W. S. Hatch's
operation did it~

A.

No. People moving into it all the time. One
company doesn't 1nake all of the industry."
·(T. 64-65).

Plaintiffs' cases relating to e1ninent domain proceedings are inapplicable in a nuisance case. For there
the rnarket value of the property at the time it is taken
is the single matter in issue and in the instant case, it
is necessary for a witness to have a basis for his testiInony as to how 1nuch the claimed depreciation of property can be attributed to any of the 1nany causes in the
vicinity.

In any e cent these rulilngs on the evidence concerning
da1nages are not preju.dical error, being made in a case
tried without a ju.ry wherein it was found thal no actionable nuisance exists.
CONCLUSION
When the trial court visited the premises and heard
the sounds produced by a mechanic pounding on a truck
frame, the operation of the pneumatic grease gun and
tire changer and the noise produced by a diesel tractor
driving about the yard, the court must have been impressed with the fact that the noises were not loud, and
in cornparison with the sounds from Onion Street traffic
and the railroad were not of such volume to constitute
a nuisance.
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The 1nost that can be said for plaintiffs' position is
that there is some conflict in the testi1nony as to the
facts. While this is an equity case, nevertheless the trial
court visited the premises in the presence of counsel, and
observed the derneanor of the witnesses, and particularly
those who showed animosity. An appellate court is at a
disadvantage in all of these things because the written
record may not truly reflect them. It is for this reason
that appellate courts in nuisance cases are reluctant to
overrule a trial judge's finding that no nuisance exists.
It is for these reasons that the Supreme Court of Utah
in no case has reversed the decision of a trial court finding the absence of a nuisance.
The record is replete with instances of defendants'
good faith in minimizing objectionable noise. If an injunction were ever issued to restrain defendants in any
of their alleged noise-1naking activities, plaintiffs would
listen harder than ever in order to obtain an order of
conten1pt and thereby embarrass defendants. This case
of disturbance and annoyance has a 1nore fundan1ental
cause than the noi'Ses plaintiffs claim emanate from their
brother's business. This is a case where no actionable
nuisance has been found by the fact finder, and one which
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does not deserve the enforce1nent arm of the law. It is
submitted that upon the record and in accordance with
the best interests of wisdon1 and justice, the decision
should be affirmed.
Respectfully subrnitted,

MARR, WILKINS & C'ANNON
C. W. WILKINS
RICHAR.D H. NEBEKER
Cownsel for Defewdatnts and
Respondents
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